摘要
文章通过对土地出让、城市建设和土地价格三者之间互动机制的分析,描述了一种以"土地融资-城市基础设施投资"间正反馈关系为核心的中国式城市建设投融资模式,并以基于2005—2011年35个大中城市面板数据的实证分析验证了其存在性。研究发现,一方面,土地价格上涨能够同时通过土地出让收入和土地抵押借款两种融资渠道放松地方政府面临的预算约束,从而显著带动城市基础设施投资规模扩大;另一方面,城市基础设施投资又能够在短期内显著地资本化到土地价格中,从而形成土地价格和城市基础设施投资间自我强化的正反馈过程。基于跨期选择模型的理论分析结果进一步表明,地方政府可以通过主动调节土地出让规模强化上述模式的效果。特别地,城市基础设施资本化效应较大和土地抵押融资率较大的城市会有意识选择"少出让、多抵押"的融资模式,以最大化土地融资总额。这一理论推断也得到了实证结果的支持。
This paper investigates a unique financing and investment channel for urban development in Chinese cities, as well as the political economic mechanism behind this channel. Using the panel data of 35 Chinese cities during 2005 to 2011, we examine the interrelationship among land leasing, infrastructure investment and land prices. Our results show that, on one hand, the growth of land price can significantly increase the land revenue of the city, and those municipal governments who have rich land revenue are able to invest heavily on urban infrastructure; on the other hand, investment on urban infrastructure will increase land prices by improving economic productivity and quality of life, in turn land revenues in proceeding periods will be higher in those cities. Based on this self-reinforced mechanism, we further analyze local governments' decision-making behavior in land sales by establishing an intertemporal choice model. The results indicate that cities with higher capitalization rate of investment into land price and higher loan-to-value ratio in borrowing prefer to finance by loans more than lease land in the current period, under the objective function of maximizing land revenue in the whole life. Our empirical results support the theoretical findings.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第8期14-27,共14页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金的资助
关键词
地方政府
土地价格基础设施投资
土地出让
Local Governments
Land Price
Infrastructure Investment
Land Leasing