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连带责任治理在供应商集群中的有效性研究 被引量:7

Research on the Effectiveness of Joint Liability Governance in the Cluster of Suppliers
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摘要 在核心企业与供应商集群的渠道关系情境下探讨连带责任治理对机会主义行为的作用,将网络中心性和使用渠道权力纳入连带责任治理研究框架,考察二者对机会主义行为的影响以及对连带责任与机会主义行为之间关系的调节效应。以一家出口企业的供应商集群为研究对象,获得82个连带责任小组样本共246个被调查者的调查数据,应用SPSS 19.0软件和层级回归法对研究假设进行检验。研究结果表明,供应商之间的连带责任对其机会主义行为有显著的抑制作用;供应商领导者的网络中心性负向影响其他供应商成员的机会主义行为,并强化连带责任对机会主义行为的抑制作用;核心企业通过使用渠道权力负向影响供应商集群的机会主义行为,但会弱化连带责任对机会主义行为的抑制作用。 In the context of channel relationship between the core enterprise and its cluster of suppliers, this paper explores theeffect of joint liability governance on opportunistic behaviors. Network centrality and exercise of channel power are combined intothe research framework of joint liability governance to examine their direct effects on opportunistic behaviors and their moderatingeffects on the relationship between joint liability and opportunistic behaviors. Through investigating the cluster of suppliers of anexport enterprise, samples of 82 joint liability teams ( a total of 246 respondents) were collected. SPSS19.0 software and hierar-chical regression method were employed to test the research hypotheses. Research results show that joint liability among suppliershas an inhibiting effect on their opportunistic behaviors. Network centrality of supplier leader negatively affects opportunistic be-haviors of other supplier members, and strengthens the inhibiting effect of joint liability on opportunistic behaviors. Exercisingchannel power by the core enterprise negatively affects suppliers' opportunistic behaviors, but weakens the inhibiting effect ofjoint liability on opportunistic behaviors.
出处 《管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第4期23-32,共10页 Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金(71172209) 武汉大学研究生自主科研项目(2013105010204)~~
关键词 供应商集群 连带责任治理 网络中心性 使用渠道权力 机会主义行为 cluster of suppliers joint liability governance network centrality exercise of channel power opportunistic behaviors
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