高管薪酬对公司业绩激励效应研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Incentive Effects of Executive Compensation on Company Performance:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listing Corporations

高管薪酬契约是解决股东与管理者之间委托代理问题的关键因素之一。以我国上市公司为样本,实证检验高管薪酬对公司业绩的激励效果。通过实证分析发现,我国上市公司高管货币薪酬对长、短期会计业绩和市场业绩均具有正向激励效应,高管持股比例仅与当期会计业绩正相关,与长期会计业绩和市场业绩不相关,这恰恰反映出目前以货币薪酬为主的高管薪酬结构既具合理性,又存在缺陷,并提出一些完善高管薪酬契约的建议。

Executive compensation contract between shareholders and managers is one of the key factors to solve the agency problem. Takes the Chinese listing corporations as samples, empirically tests incentive effects of executive compensation on firm performance. The empirical analysis finds, executive monetary compensation in the listing corporations of China has a positive incentive effects on the long - term and short - term accounting per - formance and market performance, managerial ownership rate is positively correlated with the current accounting performance, and is not related to the long - term accounting perfor - mance and market performance. It just reflects that the structure of executive compensation, dominated by the monetary compensation at present, has both a certain rationality, and def - ects, and at last puts forward some suggestions to improve executive compensation contract.