银行负债、制度环境与控股股东代理成本

Debt of Bank,Institutional Environment and the Agent Cost of Controlling Shareholder

债权人对控股股东的制衡力量在学术界一直鲜有人关注。文章就企业的银行负债对控股股东代理成本的影响进行了理论分析与实证检验,在此基础上进一步检验了产权性质对二者关系的调节作用,以及内部治理机制和法律环境与银行负债的交互作用。利用中国A股房地产上市公司2003-2011年的面板数据,研究表明:企业的银行负债显著降低了控股股东代理成本;产权性质对二者关系具有调节作用,公司内部治理机制、法律环境与银行负债存在交互作用。文章所得出的研究结论既丰富了委托代理、资本结构等相关理论,又对银行与国有企业产权改革以及企业融资决策具有较强启示意义。

The countervailing power of the creditors has been paid little attention for controlling shareholder in academia. This paper have the theoretical analysis and the empirical test on effects that debt of bank affect agency cost of controlling shareholder , then have examined moderating effect of property rights for the two variables , and have examined the interaction effect between internal governance mechanisms＆amp;law environment and debt of bank. Using listed real estate companies＆#39; panel data from 2003 to 2011 for stock market A. The results reveal that bank debt of firms decreased agency cost of controlling shareholder significantly , and we found the moderating effect of property rights and the interaction effect between internal governance mechanisms＆amp;law environment and bank debt. The conclusions enriched the principal-agent theory and the capital structure theory to some extent, Meanwhile, the conclusions have important guiding role for reforming the property rights further for the banks ＆amp; the state-owned enterprises , and choosing the types of financing for companies.