基于博弈论的铁路融资均衡管理模型研究

Study on Equilibrium Management Model of Railway Financing based on Game Theory

通过分析铁路建设融资方式主体间的博弈关系,从阐释影响融资选择机理的角度,构建以最大化预期项目自由现金流量现值为目标的铁路融资管理均衡模型,并设计相应的启发式算法求解近似纳什均衡,以期模拟铁路建设的融资活动,对融资结构进行动态优化调整。最后,结合中老铁路PPP融资模式的最优融资结构,验证算法动态的多阶段演化效果,结果显示该铁路建设项目偏好于债券融资。

Through analyzing the game relationship between main bodies of railway construction financing method, from angle of influencing financing choice, the equilibrium model of railway financing management was established by taking maximum expected project present value of free cash flow as object, and corresponding heuristic algorithm was designed to solve approximate Nash equilibrium. In order to simulate the enterprise financing activities better, dynamic optimization and adjustment were taken on financing structure. In the end, combined with optimized financing structure of the PPP financing model of China-Laos railways, the dynamic multi-stage evolution effect of the algorithm was verified, and the result shows that bond financing was preferred in the railway construction project.