概念论的合理性与限度

Rationality and Limits of Conceptualism

概念论认为知觉经验的内容完全是概念的。概念论按主题可为内容概念论与状态概念论。内容概念论与析取论以及析取论所支持的朴素实在论不相容。状态概念论兼容朴素实在论,但它存在内部不融贯的问题。要消除不融贯性,概念论就必须放弃排它性论题,回到它的限度内,提升为广义的概念论。广义的概念论可表示为如下共存论题:知觉经验既有概念内容,又有非概念内容。

Conceptualism is an important part of the project which John McDowell proposes for the problem how it is possible for thought to have empirical content.Conceptualism deems that the content of perceptual experience is totally conceptual.Conceptualism can be differentiated as content conceptualism and state conceptualism.Content conceptualism,as McDowell acknowledges,is incompatible with disjunctivism and thus naive realism.Although state conceptualism is compatible with naive realism,it is incoherent.It is argued in this paper that in order to eliminate the incoherence,state conceptualism has to reject the excluding thesis,and thus comes back to its limits.Once state conceptualism comes back to its limits,it becomes co-existence thesis.Co-existence thesis maintains that perceptual experience has both conceptual content and nonconceptual content.