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电力贸易的制度成本与GMS电力合作中的中国选择 被引量:7

Institutional Cost of Power Trade and China's Choices in GMS Power Cooperation
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摘要 本文深入分析了电力贸易的"边境效应",提出了影响电力合作的三个因素及其制度成本对电力合作类型的影响。在此基础上,对大湄公河次区域(Greater Mekong Sub-region,GMS)国家的电力合作情况进行研究。其基本结论是:GMS各国经济和电力工业发展水平的差异造成了电力合作以双边短期交易为主,而不依赖于区域性贸易安排,增加了区域电力贸易的制度成本,阻滞了区域电力市场集中交易体系建设的进程。从中国参与合作的情况来看,中国过于追求短期的个体合作收益,中方企业的急切进入以及与对象国企业之间巨大的量级差异,造成了相关国家"担忧和威胁"的心态,严重影响了合作的意愿。中国与次区域国家的电力合作难以深化且有被孤立的可能。为深化电力合作,实现区域电力市场建设的目标,本文提出以下建议:在次区域电力合作中,中国应成为积极的推动者和拉动者,继续加强国家间政治互信,深化电力市场化改革共识;根据区域电力贸易运营协议建议,加快区域合作协调机制的构建与完善,积极发挥第三方的平台作用,形成各方协同推进区域电力市场建设局面。 This paper conducts an in-depth research on the "Border Effect" of power exchange. It discusses the three factors affecting the electric power cooperation and the impact of institutional cost on the type of cooperation. On this basis, electric power cooperation among GMS countries is studied. The research findings are as follows. Due to differences in GMS countries' economic development and the level of development of power industry, bilateral short-term trading becomes the main type of cooperation rather than regional trade arrangements, which increases the institutional cost of regional power exchange and blocks the development of centralized-trading system in regional electricity market. Regarding China's partnership, China is in over pursuit of short-term gains from individual cooperation. However, the eager entrance of Chinese corporations and the magnitude advantage over the corporations in targeted countries has caused "fears and threats" mentality in these countries, which has seriously reduced the willingness of cooperation. Therefore, China's electric power cooperation with sub-regional countries can hardly be developed further and are even exposed to risks of isolation. To strengthen electric power cooperation and to realize the target of regional power market construction, the following suggestions are proposed. In the sub-regional electric power cooperation, China should become the active promoter and supporter, continue to strengthen political mutual trust between countries, and deepen consensus on the reform of the electricity market. In accordance with recommendations of regional power exchange operating agreement, China should accelerate construction and improvement of regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms, play an active role as a third-party platform, and create a collaborative environment for the construction of regional electricity market.
作者 史丹 聂新伟
出处 《财贸经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第9期124-136,共13页 Finance & Trade Economics
基金 2013年国家社科基金重大项目"中国与周边国家电力互联互通战略研究--以俄罗斯和东南亚国家为例"(13&ZD168) 中国社科院招标项目"转变经济发展方式与经济安全战略研究"的阶段性成果
关键词 电力贸易 GMS电力合作 电力互联互通 区域协调 Power Trade, GMS Power Cooperation, Power Interconnection, Regional Coordination
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