朝鲜拥核战术何以奏效?——基于懦夫博弈的分析

How Is the DPRK's Nuclear Strategy Effective? An Analysis Based on the Game of Chicken

朝鲜能够不顾中美等大国的反对先后三次进行核试验,其拥核战术成为一个令人感兴趣的研究问题。为了对之进行较为完整的理解与解释,文章以懦夫博弈为分析工具,对朝鲜拥核战术奏效的条件进行了分析,指出在行为体实力不对称的情况下,弱者无法通过"悬崖战术"来取得胜利。朝鲜拥核的成功,表层原因在于其冒险的政策风格,而深层次根源则在于中、美等博弈方有着朝核问题以外的复杂利益考虑,特别是中美在东北亚的战略博弈,改变了朝核问题博弈的收益矩阵,从而为朝鲜利用"悬崖战术"提供了空间。因此,中、美仍然掌握着朝核问题的主导权,关键是两国必须在朝鲜半岛甚至整体关系领域建立起战略信任框架,解除附加的利益考虑,还朝核问题以本来面目。

The question of how DPRK has managed to conduct three nuclear experiments in defiance of the opposition of great powers such as the U.S.and China raises an interesting research question around the DPRK's nuclear strategy.This article applies the Game of Chicken from Game Theory to provide a complete explanation and understanding of this issue.It finds that in the case of asymmetric power competition,weak powers are not able to win by using a 'brinkmanship' strategy.At surface level,the DPRK's success in playing the nuclear card relates to its dangerous diplomatic style;at a deeper level,it is the result of the complex interest considerations of other key players.In particular,considerations by the U.S.and China related to strategic competition in Northeast Asia fundamentally change the payoff matrix of the nuclear game,which provides space for the DPRK to successfully play a 'brinkmanship' strategy.This means that China and the U.S.still have the key of the Korean nuclear issue if they establish a framework for mutual strategic trust with respect to the Korean peninsula and their broader bilateral relationship and only focus on the Korean nuclear issue instead of calculating other interests.