半强制分红政策的实施效果研究

A Study on the Impacts of the Semi-mandatory Dividend Policy

本文以中国证监会出台的一系列将上市公司再融资资格与股利分配水平相挂钩的半强制分红政策为背景，以1996—2011年1787家中国A股上市公司为样本，随着对上市公司派现要求的从无到有，最低派现标准由模糊变明确，通过观察公司派现行为的变化来考察半强制分红政策的实施效果。研究发现，上市公司的派现意愿和派现水平在政策出台后显著提高，但是现金分红具体量化要求的出台并没有使现金流充沛的公司更多派现。同时该政策出台后，上市公司在再融资前出现集中大幅派现的情况。这些结果表明，半强制分红政策对提高股东现金股利回报和保护投资者利益所起的作用有限，其合理性值得怀疑。

A series of Semi - mandatory Dividend Policies （hereinafter ＂the Policy＂ ） , set by the China Securities Regulatory Commission （CSRC） since 2000, are to regulate dividend policy of listed companies, particularly those with refinancing needs. This paper examines whether and how 1787 A - share listed companies＇payout policy is affected during 1996 -2011. It shows that the Policy leads more companies to pay cash dividends, but fails to push cash cows to pay more cash when a minimum level of dividend payment was specified by CS- RC. This paper also find a spike in cash dividends payment right before companies＇ refinancing activities after the Policy was implemented. Our results indicate that the Policy plays a limited role in raising cash dividend return and investor protection, and thus its rationality is doubtful.