零售商议价势力及其福利效应——兼论通道费的起因

Retailer's Bargaining Power and Its Welfare Effects:Concurrently Discussing the Origin of Slotting Allowances

零售商与生产商在分销渠道内不同的权力分配将导致不同的结果。根据显示偏好原理界定零售商议价势力及其代理指标,并将其引入经典的报童模型,计算出进一步分析和比较的参考基准。然后逐一分析零售商议价势力对最优采购量、零售商利润、生产商利润和总渠道利润的影响,结果表明,零售商议价势力对最优采购量和零售商利润具有正面效应,对生产商利润和总渠道利润的效应不确定,可能一直为负,也可能先正后负。模型的扩展分析表明,通道费作为一种补偿机制,与较高的批发价格相结合,将同时增加零售商利润、生产商利润和渠道总利润,但由于降低了最优采购量而对消费者福利产生负面效应。

Different distribution of power between retailer and manufacturer in channel will lead to different results. Firstly,retailer’s bargaining pow er and its proxy is defined according to principle of revealed preference,and be introduced into the classical new sboy-model,educing the benchmark for further analysis and comparison. Then,effects of bargaining pow er on optimal purchasing quantity,retailer’s profit,manufacturer’s profit,and total channel profit are discussed respectively. The results show that bargaining pow er has positive effects on optimal stock and retailer’s profit,but its effects on manufacturer’s and total channel profit is indeterminate,maybe alw ays passive,or first negative and then positive. The extended model explains the origin of slotting allow ances,w hich,as a compensation for higher w holesale price,can increase the profit of retailer,manufacturer and total channel,but decrease optimal purchasing quantity thereby have negative effect on consumer w elfare.