职工特征、股权性质与薪酬支付——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Employee Characteristics,Ownership Property,and Payment:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

利用2007-2011年上市公司公开披露的职工特征和薪酬信息,研究在中国特有工资制度下职工特征如何影响企业薪酬支付。研究发现:企业支付给高学历职工更高薪酬,给予不同岗位职工不同的薪酬待遇;国有产权和垄断强化了学历的工资效应,并使岗位价值贡献与薪酬支付出现错配;在岗位业绩无法准确衡量的情况下,学历对岗位薪酬有交互作用。结论表明,相对于民营企业,国有企业错配了学历与岗位薪酬。研究从企业层面提供的有关教育工资效应的经验证据是对宏观或个人层面文献的有益补充,也拓展了普通职工薪酬类文献,有助于理解职工教育特征在职工薪酬支付中的重要作用。

Based on the unique wage system in China, we explore how the characteristics of staff education affect corporate payroll costs,using the data publicly disclosed from 2007 to 2011.We find that highly educated employees are paid more,and employees in different positions get different compensations.In addition,the effect of education on employees＆#39; compensation is strengthened in the state-owned enterprises （SOEs）and monopoly industries,but the employees＆#39; compensation may not be positively related to their contributions. If there is a lack of valid measures of employees＆#39;performances in a particular position,employees＆#39; compensation is interactively determined by their levels of education and position. The results show that the employees＆#39;compensation is not matched with their education and positions in SOEs,compared with non-SOEs.This paper provides empirical evidence on the return to education at firm level, which is supplementary to the previous research at the macro or individual level.It also contributes to the literature in the compensation of non-executive employees,and helps us understand the role of education in employees＆#39; compensation.