银行真的能识别盈余管理吗?——基于银行借款合约的研究

Are Banks Really Able to Detect Earnings Management? Empirical Evidence Based on the Bank Loan Contracts

利用银行借款合约研究盈余管理与银行借款担保之间的关系,检验银行能否识别上市公司的盈余管理行为。通过使用2001-2012年1319笔银行借款数据,以操控性应计利润衡量盈余管理,实证检验发现:盈余管理与银行借款担保没有表现出显著的正相关关系;盈余管理程度不同公司的银行借款担保概率与财务业绩的相关性不存在显著差异。进一步研究发现,如果银行预测到公司未来现金流较低,或在金融市场发展水平较高的地区,公司盈余管理程度越高,银行借款需要担保的概率越大。研究表明,银行在一定程度上能够识别公司盈余管理行为。

Using the bank loan contracts,we investigate the relationship between earnings management and bank loan guarantee,in order to examine whether banks are able to detect earnings management in listed firms.Based on a sample of 1319 bank loans during 2001 -2012, this paper measures earnings management using discretionary accruals.The empirical results show that there is no significant association between bank loan guarantee and earnings management. Firms with different levels of earnings management are not significantly different in the relations between the probability of bank loan guarantee and financial performance.However,if the bank anticipates that the firms＆#39;future cash flows are relatively low,or the firms are located in the regions with more developed financial markets,the probability of bank loan guarantee is positively associated with earnings management.On the whole,this paper concludes that banks are able to detect earnings management to some extent.