摘要
食品可追溯体系是消除食品供应链信息不对称的有效手段,本文通过向消费者提供更多的食品质量安全信息改变消费者的支付意愿,研究市场机制在解决食品安全问题中的有效作用。在由食品加工企业和农户构成的食品安全供应链中,分析基于消费者支付意愿的农户与食品加工企业的博弈行为,得出了食品加工企业对农户进行监管的条件,以及农户按照与食品加工企业签订的可追溯食品契约进行生产的激励措施,并给出了政府在可追溯制度实施中对食品加工企业的激励设计要求。
The food traceability system is the effec- tive method to eliminate the information asymmetry in the food supply chain. In this paper, by providing more information about food quality and safety for con- sumers to change their willingness to pay, we analyze the useful effect of the market mechanism which solves the problem of food safety. In the food safety supply chain composed of farmers and food processing compa- nies, we analyze the game behavior between farmers and food processing companies based on consumer willing- ness to pay. And we conclude the conditions where food processing companies supervise farmers. This paper does not only explore the incentive measures of farmers who produce traceable food according to the contract with food processing companies, but also shows the in- centive designing requirements of food processing com- panies raised by the government in the traceability system implementation.
出处
《特区经济》
2014年第8期97-99,共3页
Special Zone Economy
基金
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金(2012SJB630049)
江苏省社科联青年文化精品项目(13SQB-054)
南京邮电大学2013年STITP省级项目(SYB2013018)资助
关键词
消费者支付意愿
博弈
食品安全
可追溯制度
consumer willingness to pay
game
food safety
traceability system