土地使用权和经济适用房建设捆绑拍卖的机制设计

Mechanism Design for Bundling Auction of Land and Affordable Housing Construction

目前经济适用房供给问题比较突出,是由于地方政府和开发商出于自身利益的考虑均缺乏积极性。在经济适用房的供给问题上,政府显然起着主导作用,但同时也要充分调动社会的力量,才能尽快有效地解决这个问题。提供了一种供给方式,通过将土地拍卖和经济适用房建设捆绑的机制设计,引导市场力量承担经济适用房建设的任务,兼顾土地收益和经济适用房的供给。通过模型可以看出,政府在促进经济适用房建设和引导开发商参与的问题上要有决心和强硬态度;同时也要充分考虑开发商的利益,吸引开发商参与投标建设。政府还应采取有效措施保证和提高拍卖实现的概率。

Since local authorities and developers lack of interest to develop affordable housing,affordable housing supply are insufficient. Though the local authority plays leading role in supplying affordable housing,to meet the demand, the developer shall be encouraged to do so. In the paper,a mechanism is designed for bundling auction of land and affordable housing construction to balance land interest and affordable housing supply. The mechanism is designed mainly to attract and direct developers to build more affordable housing. From analysis of the mechanism,to sufficiently supply affordable housing, the authority shall hold tough attitude and take effective actions,and the developer shall be directed to be the main supply source of affordable housing. In the process of the auction,the authority shall make sure the auction will be done with enough probability.