终极控股股东超额控制与多元化折价实证分析

Study of Ultimate Controlling Shareholder's Excess Control and Corporate Diversification Discounts

以2006年至2012年中国A股上市公司为样本考察终极控股股东超额控制对多元化经营行为及其经济后果的影响。实证结果表明:终极控股股东出于谋取自身利益的目的,会倾向于利用多元化经营进行利益转移,因此超额控制程度较高的上市公司多元化程度更高。此外,由于,超额控制程度的提高会加剧公司中的委托代理问题,因此与超额控制程度较低的上市公司相比,在超额控制程度较高的上市公司中实施多元化经营会导致更为严重的多元化折价。

With the data of listed companies from 2006 to 2012, this thesis analysis the relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholder＇ s excess control and corporate diversification discounts. The results show that excess control is positively related to corporate diversification, because of the purse of benefits by the ultimate controlling shareholder. And the result also show that the excess control is positively related to corporate diversification discounts, which means when the excess control is stronger the discount is larger, because excess control makes the agency problem worse.