中央及地方财政格局下公路收费的影响、成因及对策

The Effects,Reasons and Reform Strategies of Road-toll System under Central and Local Fiscal Pattern

本文采用混合组平均(PMG)及广义矩估计(GMM)方法,实证检验了当前公路收费制度对我国经济发展的影响并探索了其作用机制。研究发现过高的收费水平已经不利于经济增长:收费水平每提高1%会导致GDP增长率放缓0.005%、人均GDP降低0.04%。由此计算出该制度在2012年新增社会经济成本约为1660亿元,大于其收益。该制度的作用机制通过促进路网建设、降低国内贸易总量及市场整合程度两个相反作用实现。本研究将高收费归咎于分税制改革下地方预算内财力的不足。这些发现为政策制定者提供了必要的参考:中央财政应加大在路网建设中的作用,同时通过预算内转移支付的方式补偿改革过程中地方政府的损失。

Based on Pool Mean Group （PMG） and General Method of Moment （GMM） methods, this paper attempts to empirically examine the effects of current road-toll system on economic growth and explore its mechanism. We find that high toll level has brought significant negative impacts on economic growth： increase in toll by 1% will correspondingly lead to a decrease in GDP growth rate by 0. 005% and decrease in GDP per capita by 0. 04%. A cost of 166 billion RMB in 2012 is accordingly calculated, suggesting the cost of the system has outweighed its benefit. The system plays its roles through increasing road-net construction, decreasing domestic trade volume and market integration. We argue that the high charge level could be attributed to financial pressure of local government due to the 1994 fiscal reform. The implication of the findings indicates the important role of central government in road-net construction and budgetary fiscal transfer payment.