再融资与股利政策挂钩的经济后果和潜在问题

Economic Consequences and Potential Problems of the Policy of Linking Refinancing Qualifications to Companies＇ Dividend Payment Level

本文直接检验了2008年10月9日中国证监会颁布的《关于修改上市公司现金分红若干规定的决定》（以下简称《决定》）对公司现金股利支付行为的影响，并在此基础上评价《决定》可能存在的潜在问题。研究发现，《决定》的颁布对公司现金股利行为产生了明显影响，有融资动机的公司会增加现金股利支付；但是，有融资动机的公司更可能会仅支付满足监管要求的最低现金股利支付率，存在股利支付的机会主义行为。同时，《决定》在执行过程中也存在潜在的问题，我们发现提出融资方案的公司股利波动性较大，存在“突击”分红的可能性；上市公司再融资方案通过（或否决）之后，公司的现金股利支付意愿明显下降，不排除存在“钓鱼武”支付的可能性。本文的研究不仅丰富了现有股利研究的文献，也对完善相关政策具有重要的借鉴意义。

This paper analyzes the impact of ＂Decisions on Amending Some Provisions on Cash Dividends by Listed Companies＂ （hereinafter referred to as the ＂Decisions＂） released by CSRS on October 9, 2008 on company＇s cash dividend payment behaviors and evaluate the po- tential problems that may exist. The empirical results show that, the ＂Decisions＂ significant- ly affects the companies＇ cash dividend payment behaviors and increases the companies＇ cash dividend. Specifically, companies with high refinancing motive will pay more cash dividends, and those who with no refinancing motive may only maintain a minimum cash dividend pay- ment ratio to meet regulatory requirements. This means the existence of increasing payment of cash dividends to avoid regulatory. Further evidences imply potential problems in imple- mentation o{ the ＂Decisions＂. We find that companies who propose refinancing experience high volatility on cash dividend payment and companies＇ willingness to pay cash dividends de- crease significantly after refinancing proposal been accepted （or rejected）. This study not only enriches the existing dividends research literature, but also has important reference signifi- cance to improve related policies.