政策性负担、产权配置与上市公司高管薪酬——基于薪酬业绩敏感性视角的分析

Policy Burden,Property Rights Allocation and Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies——A Perspective of Pay-Performance Sensitivity

以2007－2009年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,从政府干预的视角考察企业承担的政策性负担对公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,探讨不同产权配置下的企业承担的政策性负担对公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响差异。结果发现,企业承担的政策性负担显著降低了公司高管薪酬对业绩的敏感性;进一步发现,在不同的产权属性和层级状况下,政策性负担对公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响存在显著差异。研究结论表明,将薪酬与业绩相关联的激励合约其有效性的发挥依赖于一定的制度环境,我国转轨经济环境下的公司承担的政策性负担将导致高激励强度的薪酬合约并非是最优选择。

The dissertation selects a sample of A-share listed companies in gear from 2007 to 2009 to study how policy burden influence the executive compensation-performance sensitivity in different property rights allocation mode. The dissertation＇s empirical analysis shows： there is a strong correlation between executive compensation and performance. Policy burden reduces the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance significantly. Moreover, there are differences in the influences of policy burden in different property rights allocation mode. policy burden has a greater effect on state-owned firms than non-state-owned firms, on local government-owned firms than central government-owned firms and on protective industries than non protective industries. Therefore, in the period of economic transition, the policy burden of corporate leads the high sensitivity of the executive compensation,performance to be a second-best option for government.