摘要
本文选用2009-2011年沪深制造业上市公司数据,研究了纵向一体化和股权联盟两类专用性投资治理模式的治理效率问题。研究结果表明:在专用性投资治理上,相比纵向一体化,股权联盟这种混合治理模式效率更高;随着专用性投资的增加,更多的选择纵向一体化治理模式,并不能显著的提升企业绩效,但是,更多的选择股权联盟治理模式,可以显著提升企业绩效。本文的研究深化了交易成本理论对于专用性投资治理模式选择的认识,具有重要的理论意义和实践意义。
Although Transaction cost economics (TCE) has guided a variety of research on governance in the strategic management literature, it remains unclear whether these governance decisions affect firn performance. This article proposes that different governance structures will have different governance efficiencies for specific assets. The Equity Alliance is more efficient than vertical integration. Data from Chinese A share listed manufacturing firms during 2009-2011 provide support for our hypotheses that the increase in specific assets will increase the firm performance on equity alliance governance. These findings also have profound practical implications.
出处
《西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2014年第4期17-23,共7页
Journal of Xidian University:Social Science Edition
基金
上海高校青年教师培养资助计划(slg12012)
上海理工大学人文社会科学资助项目(13XSY12)
关键词
纵向一体化
股权联盟
专用性投资
vertical integration
equity alliance
specific assets