摘要
"自我"问题是哲学史上的老问题,维特根斯坦在"语言转向"的大背景下对这一问题作出了推进。前期维特根斯坦认为自我是界限主体或形而上学主体,同时,"我的语言的界限意味着我的世界的界限"。唯我论与实在论是一致的。中后期维特根斯坦认为人们在自我问题上受到表面形式的相似性的诱惑而导致各种哲学疑惑,需要通过对语言日常用法的分析来得到澄清。维特根斯坦前期和中后期自我思想所持有的是一种反客体主义的思路,即指出自我不是经验对象,而忽视这一点正是哲学家们讨论自我问题时所犯的错误所在。
The problem of "self" is an old issue in philosophical history. Wittgenstein made a break-through on the ground of the "linguistic turn". Early Wittgenstein thought that self is the limit subject or the metaphysical subject. "The limit of my language means the limit of my world", and, there is a uniformity between Solipsism and Realism. Middle and later Wittgenstein thought people confuse with the similarity of surface grammar leading to the philosophy puzzles. An analysis of ordinary language helps to clarify that. Both early and middle or later Wittgenstein holds an anti-objectivism approach. He points out that self is not an experience object, and the ignorance of that is the mistake philosophers made in the puzzle of self.
出处
《河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第4期38-42,共5页
Journal of Hebei University(Philosophy and Social Science)