摘要
最近,政治哲学家们对社会自由、政治自由,尤其是无干涉自由和无支配自由概念给予了较多关注。概括而言,目前存在着三种不同的自由理念,它们分别是心理自由或精神自由、伦理自由或道德自由、政治自由或社会自由。这些自由在人的自由体系中占据不同的位置,具有不同的价值,依次呈现为意志自生自由、意志自主自由和意志自为自由。意志自生自由是指人们拥有对呈现在任何一次选择中的诸多选项进行慎思的心理能力。意志自主自由是指人们具有与可靠地实践那种能力相匹配的道德品质或技能,展示人们对将引导其开展慎思的诸多考虑的真实感悟。意志自为自由则是指人们在做出自由选择时得到政治保护,以至于他们能被视为自由人。无干涉自由和无支配自由具有本质差别,后者更接近人的本质。当我们讨论政治自由和社会自由时,最终必定会触及无支配自由。
With the distinction between freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination, I identify three kinds of freedom, the first psychological or mental, the second ethical or moral, and the third political or social. It is important to distinguish these different ideals of freedom, not just for reasons of clarity, but also for reasons of policy. Just as the robot fits this minimal specification for being an agent, so will most animals, in particular human animals like you and me. We may be rather more versatile in the purposes we pursue, and better equipped in the sources of evidence that shape our representations, but still it remains true that we resemble the robot m normany pul^uH,s ^-^-v representations. But we human beings differ in one striking respect from the robot, and perhaps from all other animals. We often deliberate in the course of forming our representations and our purposes; we are not confined, like the robot, to responding more or less autonomieally to the changes it registers in its environment. Our deliberative capacity is important because, as I shall argue, it is what makes room for the idea of the free will.
出处
《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第5期6-18,共13页
Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences
关键词
无干涉自由
无支配自由
意志自生自由
意志自主自由
意志自为自由
freedom as non-interference
freedom as non-domination
freedom in the will
freedom of the will
freedom for the will