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网球战术行为“混合策略”理论验证 被引量:10

Test of the “Mixed Strategy”Theory in Tennis Tactical Behavior
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摘要 博弈理论指出在交互策略行为中博弈方遵循纳什均衡策略或者混合纳什均衡策略思想,并指出要随机化自己的策略选择,不能够表现出很强的规律性,因为一旦被对方熟知即可被利用来增大获益。高水平网球运动竞赛是"二人零和"博弈,含有参与人、策略、支付等博弈要素,所以提出假设高水平网球运动竞赛是不是符合博弈理论的一些基本思想,如"混合策略"理论和战术行为选择是否随机等都有待我们去验证。以博弈分析理论的基础理论思想为指导,采用拟和优度卡方检验,Kolmogorov-Smirnov检验和游程检验等方法对现代竞技网球运动竞赛进行了理论验证,得出:博弈论的理论思想在网球博弈行为中的验证过程,证明了"混合策略"理论与预期的一致性,同时发球序列独立的检验也与经验相符即网球运动员都意图随机化自己的行动,使对手难以预测。但是值得说明的是网球运动员的战略行为"混合策略"使用以及随机化选择都是以个人特长技术、打法类型等为基础。 Game theory has pointed out that game player will follow the Nash equilibrium orthe mixed Nash equilib- rium strategy thoughts in the act of interactive strategy. It has also pointed out that strategy should be randomly chosen and can't be strong regularity or it will be used by adversary to increase benefit after he knows it. High lev- el of tennis competition, which is a two-person zero-sum game, contains some game elements, such as participa- tors, strategies and payoffs. So we have to test mixed strategy and tactic options if we suppose that high level of tennis competition is eonformed some thoughts of game theory. Based on basic theoretical thoughts of game theory, this paper testified them with modem tennis competition by the methods of goodness chi-square test, Kolmogrov- Smirnov test, and runs test. The results showed that mixed strategy theory matches the hypothesis. At the same time, serving sequence is related to experience or all the players intend to randomize their play to make opponent hard to predict their serving. But it is worth to mention that usage of player's mixed strategy and randomized selec- tion are based on their advantage skill and style of play.
出处 《北京体育大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第8期124-130,共7页 Journal of Beijing Sport University
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目
关键词 网球 战术行为 最小最大定理 混合策略均衡 tennis tactical behavior minimax theorem mixed strategy equilibrium
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参考文献13

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