基于博弈理论的新型农村金融机构脆弱性分析

The Fragility Analysis of New Rural Financial Institutions Based on the Game Theory

新型农村金融机构的发展为"三农"建设提供了强大的金融支持,然而新型农村金融机构的脆弱性却较少引起学者关注。基于脆弱性的功能视角,分别研究了新型农村金融机构与借款农户间的、普通商业银行与贷款者间的博弈过程与博弈记过。研究表明:金融机构的脆弱性源于信贷的外部性;新型农村金融机构比普通商业银行具备更强的脆弱性;其产生的根源在于农户的还款能力与意识的缺乏、担保抵押资产的低质和信用制约的缺失。

The development of the new rural financial institutions provides a powerful financial support to the construction of ＂three agriculture＂. However, the fragility of the new rural financial institutions has aroused little concern of scholars. Based on the fragile functional perspective, this article studies the game process and game results between the new rural financial institutions and the borrowing farmers as well as the ordinary commercial banks and the creditor respectively. According to the results, we can draw the following conclusions. First, the fragility of the financial institutions originates from the externality of the credit. Second, the new rural financial institutions are much more fragile than the ordinary commercial banks. Third, it comes from the absence of the repayment ability and awareness of the farmers, the inferiority of the mortgage assets and the lack of credit restricts.