摘要
我国当前实施的农村义务教育经费供给政策存在严重的"信息"和"激励"问题。由于信息不对称和信息缺失,农村义务教育经费供给责任被层层下放,并出现经费被挤占和挪用的现象;由于激励不相容和激励不足,基层教育管理部门出现了低报生均杂费和公用经费标准、不落实或不能足额落实本级财政的配套资金等现象。改进我国农村义务教育经费保障机制成效,在机制设计理论视域下,围绕"信息"和"激励"两个因素,应"以县分类"重新划分农村义务教育区,针对不同类型的县区,明确各级政府的农村义务教育经费供给责任,并设计相应的经费分担模式。
There are serious information and incentive problems in the rural compulsory education funding system. Because of information asymmetry and lack of information ,the mechanism ignored the difference between provinces and areas within provinces,placed the burden layer upon layer,and could not prohibit funds being diverted. Due to incentive incompatibilities and incentive is insufficient ,it appeared that the local governments low reported the public funds standard ,did not implement or could not carry out their financial responsibility. From the perspective of mechanism design theory ,the only way to get out this dilemma is to reform current system,and establish county classification rural compulsory education funding system,design different responsibility distribution mode for different counties.
出处
《现代教育管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第9期59-63,共5页
Modern Education Management
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"农村义务教育供给机制与政策研究"(10CJY039)
2011年江苏省教育科学"十二五"规划重点资助项目"江苏城乡义务教育均衡发展的财政保障政策研究"(B-a/2011/01/007)
关键词
农村义务教育
教育经费供给
机制设计
rural compulsory education
education funds supply
mechanism design