实用主义是相对主义吗?——评威廉·詹姆斯的真理观

Is Pragmatism Relativism?——on William James′s Theory of Truth

对威廉·詹姆斯的真理学说的考察,可以证明实用主义并非相对主义,并澄清人们对实用主义的种种误解。通过逐一分析、讨论并反驳"有用即真理"、"真理等于证实过程"、"仅有辩护,并无真理"等对詹姆斯真理论的质疑,可以证明实用主义一方面从新的旨趣出发重塑哲学形态,另一方面则在新的形态中竭力维护科学的严格性,捍卫真理,坚守理性的边界。詹姆斯的真理论正是这种尝试的产物,用一种新的理论范式抗拒相对主义和怀疑主义。

Through researching on William James′s theory of truth, this paper intends to prove that pragmatism is not relativism and to clear up a variety of misunderstandings for pragmatism. It makes effort to show that some philosophers′ interpretations on James′ s theory of truth, such as 'To be useful is to be true', 'Truth is verification', 'Only justification, no truth'; are wrong, asserting that pragmatism, from a new perspective and interest, reshapes philosophy and by means of new form,persists in the rigor of science, seeks truth, and defends the borders of reason. James' s theory of truth is the result of trying: it tries to establish a new paradigm of theory in order to resist relativism and skepticism.