基于三阶段博弈模型的制造业碳税征收机制设计

The Design of Carbon Tax Levy Mechanism Based on Three-stage Game Theory

应对国际出台诸多严控碳排放量的政策对我国产品生产及发展带来的冲击,以碳税征收机制对低碳产品与普通产品影响为切入点,建立政府、企业以及消费者三阶段博弈模型,以制造业双寡头市场为研究对象,探讨最佳碳税征收机制的制定。研究结果表明:建立的四种碳税征收组合机制对社会总福利均有损失影响,面向生产低碳产品的企业利润角度,应实行高碳税税率低碳税配比政策;面向产品市场需求角度,应实行低碳税税率高碳税配比政策。

Encountering the threat of strict international carbon emission controlling policies to the production and development of the products in China, we built the three-stage game model of the government, enterprises and consumers so as to analyze the influences of carbon tax levy mechanism to both the low-carbon and common products. And discussed the best carbon tax levy mechanism, taking the duopoly market in manufacturing industry as the research object. The results show that all of the four carbon tax levy combination mecha- nisms leads to the loss of the total social welfare, and we should implement the proportioning of high carbon tax rate and low carbon tax from the view of business profit of the enterprises producing low carbon products; we should implement the proportioning of low carbon tax rate and high carbon tax from the view of the production market demands.