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反复性紧张局势的后果研究——以东亚双边争端为例 被引量:14

On the Aftermath of Repeated Episodes of Tension:An Analysis of Bilateral Disputes in East Asia
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摘要 反复性紧张局势是双边争端的普遍特征。行为体间一系列反复发生的紧张局势已经成为东亚地区海上争端的基本特征。作者在已有的竞争进化论、学习理论与螺旋模型研究的基础上,结合国际关系中情感要素研究的最新成果,分析这类反复性紧张局势的后果。重复且尚未解决的一系列紧张事件应该被视为一种相互承接的过程,先前的事件会成为后续事件发生的背景因素。随着每次紧张局势的爆发,政治形势会发生相应的变化,在未解决的争端中,反复出现的紧张局势会加剧双边对抗。由于争端行为体间缺乏有效的沟通和协调会使紧张状态持续,并刺激领导人在下一次危机中采用更为强硬的手段,反复性紧张局势会使双方的摩擦愈加频繁和强烈,同时反复性危机中的心理效应和国内政治动态作用于领导人和公众两个层次,鼓励他们在危机中孤注一掷而非采取妥协的策略。作者对比了一系列东亚海上领土争端中反复性紧张局势的后果,从而说明这一逻辑。 Bilateral disputes feature repeated episodes of tension and the recurring episodes of tension between actors has become a main characteristic of maritime territorial disputes in East Asia.Building on existing work on evolving rivalries,learning,and spiral models,but adding additional insights from more recent work on emotions within international relations,this paper is to analyze the aftermath of those repeated episodes of tension.We believe that iterated,unresolved episodes of tension need to be viewed in an integrated fashion,whereby the previous event sets the context for the next.With each outbreak of tension,the political terrain shifts,and repeated crises will aggravate the conflicts over the unresolved disputes.Thus,leaders are induced to adopt tougher stance in the next round of tension due to lack of effective communication and coordination.Meanwhile,the psychological effects and domestic political dynamics exert influence on both leaders and the public,and encourage them to adopt more assertive and potentially escalatory moves rather than compromising policies.This hypothesis is tested by the aftermath of crises within the context of China's relations with its neighbors,namely,Japan,the Philippines,and Vietnam.
出处 《世界经济与政治》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第9期50-74,157-158,共25页 World Economics and Politics
关键词 持久竞争 紧张关系 领土争端 东亚 安全 enduring dyadic rivalries tension territorial dispute East Asia
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