地方政府行为与债务积累的理论逻辑

Theoretical logic of local government behavior and debt accumulation

地方政府行为对债务积累起着关键作用。地方政府不但是地方的管理者和公共物品的提供者,而且它更是一个组织,符合"经济人"假设。在垂直集中的选拔制度、以GDP作为主要指标的考核制度与中国特色的财政联邦制度等多重约束下,我国地方政府有着增加投资的巨大激励,并有典型的"利己主义"即腐败和"道德困境"即深信中央政府会"兜底"的特征,结果造成了地方债务高垒。构建地方政府资产负债表、改变单纯以GDP为主要指标的考核制度及实施举债追责制是控制地方债务风险的解决办法。

The behavior of local government plays a key role in debt accumulation. Local government is not only local manager and provider of public goods but also an organization which conforms to the hypothesis of＂economic man＂ . Under the multi con- straints, such as vertical concentrated selection system, the assessment system of taking GDP as the major indicator and federal fiscal system with Chinese characteristics etc., Chinese local government has great incentive to increase input. It takes the features of typical＂egoism＂, i.e. corruption, and＂moral dilemma＂, i.e. believing the central government will＂solve all the problems＂. As a result, the level of local government debt becomes higher and higher. To control the risk of local government debt, it is necessary to construct local government asset sheet, change the assessment system of taking GDP as the sole standard and implement debt accountability system.