范畴、现象学还原与被给予性

Category,Phenomenological Reduction and Givenness

在描述心理学中,范畴的直观被给予性奠基于代现性内容的实项的被给予性。但是,由于质料的综合先天无法突入一种只能依赖最低种差才能被确定,而自身却无法就其自身被描述的"感性"内容的融合,现象学认识论因而只能被封闭在种属关联中。借助区域本质学对质料的综合先天的根本突破,胡塞尔不仅彻底扬弃了这种封闭性以及融合内容的不可知性,从而为现象学还原提供了先天的根据和事态基础,而且也向我们揭示了一种在事态层次上与实项被给予性具有根本差异的原初的自身被给予性。

In descriptive psychology, the intuitive givenness of category is founded on the reell givenness of representative content. However, the material synthesis a priori can＇t break into some kind of mixture of ＂sensible＂ content which is only relied on the lowest specific difference and cant be described as itself, so the phenomenological epistemology is enclosed in the relation between genus and species. In virtue of the fundamental breakthrough in the material synthesis a priori by regional eidetics, Husserl has not only sublated thoroughly this kind of closure and the unknowability of the mixed content so that he provides the basis and the foundation of state of affairs for phenomenological reduction, but also revealed a kind of origin givenness in-self which includes a radical difference in the hierarchy of state of affairs and the reell givenness.