国有企业高管为什么会滋生隐性腐败?

Why do State-owned Enterprises Produce Implicit Corruption?

本文以超额在职消费作为量化高管隐性腐败的代理变量,利用中国国有上市公司2006—2012年相关财务数据,研究国有企业高管隐性腐败的原因。实证研究发现,权力过大、信息不透明、监督机制不健全是国有企业高管滋生隐性腐败的主要成因,而激励机制对高管隐性腐败影响并不显著。进一步的研究发现,信息透明度的提高能抑制利用权力的腐败行为,还能强化监督机制对腐败的抑制作用。因此,要抑制国有企业高管隐性腐败,就应当限制高管权力,进一步完善监督机制,"把权力关进制度的笼子里"。更为重要的是,应强化国有企业高管个人信息披露,提高国有企业经营运作的信息透明度,把权力置于阳光之下。

In our paper, corruption is divided into explicit corruption and implicit corruption. Based on the division, we investigate why state-owned enterprises produce implicit corruption using data on Chinese non-state-listed firms from 2006 to 2012. Taking excess non-pecuniary compensation as a proxy variable of implicit corruption, empirical study finds that excessive power significantly affect implicit corruption, and opaque information may improve the possibility of implicit corruption, and the efficiency of supervisory mechanism also significantly affect implicit corruption. But incentive mechanism does not obviously affect implicit corruption. Further study find that information transparency could weaken the relation between the power and implicit corruption,but also strengthen the relation between the monitoring mechanism and implicit corruption. But the power and monitoring mechanism can＇ t play the role as information transparency. Based on the result, we think that information transparency is the most important factor to restrain implicit corruption. Therefore, in order to effectively restrain the state-owned enterprises＇ implicit corruption, something should be done ： First, government should stick to the market reform direction of state-owned enterprises, and limit state-owned enterprises＇ kinds of privileges. In the current reform of mixed sector of the state-owned enterprises, under conditions permitting, administrative managers should be replaced by professional managers, and state-owned enterprises should reduce the administrative appointment of executives step by step. At the same time, it should further improve the corporate governance system for limiting the power of first leader. Second, we should actively promote institution building, and use the institution system and the law system to govern corruption. This is called ＂shutting the power in the institution＇s cage＂. These institutions which can to some extent curb corruption insist of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, officials＇ property disclosure, and media supervision which may watch corruption in media market competition environment. Third, though the method of institutional anti-corruption is very important, the method still exist some defects. It is because that any institution inevitably has some defects, and each system can＇ t be perfect. Meanwhile, China is a country of relational contracts, even if the system is perfect, a perfect system might also likely to be eroded by the various relationships in our country. So, how dose solve the defects of institu- tional anti-corruption？ We should let the power run in the sun and in the transparent environment, which everyone can supervise the power, and everyone can supervise corruption. In all, we consider that the anti-corruption efforts can be divided into three phases. The first stage is campaignstyle anti-corruption. Campaign-style anti-corruption would gain some success, relying on the support of leaders. But experiences show that in Russia and other countries, in the long term, campaign-style anti-corruption is difficult to receive good,sustained effect（Lang,2013 ）. The second stage is institutional anti-corruption. The institutional anti- corruption should be a good method to solution to the problem of corruption. But it still has flaws, especially in a relationship-based society, these defects, will be more prominent. The third stage is the institutional anti-corruption with information transparent anduniversal participation The third stage can realize the situation of everyone supervision on corruption, which should indeed tackle the problem of corruption.