期刊文献+

顾客参与创新的团队协作激励机制——基于互惠动机公平模型的研究 被引量:10

A Research of Incentives of Innovative Customers' Team Cooperation Based on Reciprocity Motivation Fairness Model
原文传递
导出
摘要 随着信息技术的迅猛发展以及顾客的日渐成熟,顾客创新的战略重要性得到更为广泛的关注。本文基于Dufwenberg&Kirchsteiger(2004)的动机公平模型,结合物质支付和心理互惠支付,建立创新顾客团队协作激励模型。通过激励模型的求解与分析,探讨互惠敏感度与最优顾客有效参与时间、个人绩效报酬系数、团队产出分享系数以及企业期望收益之间的函数关系。研究结果显示,企业雇佣具有互惠偏好的顾客参与产品创新,能增加企业的期望效益;团队协作的实现需要满足基本条件;积极互惠对于最优顾客有效参与时间、个人绩效报酬系数、团队产出分享系数的影响效应与消极互惠情况下的影响效应恰好相反。此外,通过产品提升项目的算例来检验模型的分析结论。最后,提出相应的管理启示。 With the rapid development of information technology and increasingly sophisticated customers, the strategic importance of customer innovation is being widely concerned. Existing literatures show that customer participation plays a positive role in the promotion of enterprises' income levels which can' t be ignored. It is very important for enterprises to have the sustainable competitive advantage that establishing an effective incentive mechanism to attract customers to participate in enterprises' product or service innovation. According to Lovelock,Young (1979) and Mills (1986) 's point of view,customers can be seen as employees" by enterprises. Similarly ,Wang Yong-gui (2011) also thinks that when the enterprises regard "part of customers as a kind of resources and use this kind of resources,the enterprises must take the customers as is a special kind of "employees" to treat as. In addition, in the establishment of incentive mechanism, the enterprise is difficult to observe the behavior of customers when the enterprise obtains information from customers and integrates the information into the product innovation process, so there is principal-agent relationship between the enterprise and customers. Therefore, it can use the principal-agent theory to study the design of customer innovation incentive mechanism. Moreover, as the influence of the social preference to strategy implementation of modem enterprise incentive becomes more and more important, researching on the impact of social preference on participants' behaviors will be more close to reality and explain the formation of many distinctive business incentives combined with behavioral economics and the existing incentive theory. Therefore, it is necessary for enterprises to develop incentive measures specifically for innovative customers which have equity preference. Despite many scholars have attached importance customer participation both in theory and practice, the to the significance of establishing the incentive mechanism of hteratures about the optimal customer participation incentives which incorporate with social preferences are stiU very few. According to Camerer and Fehr' s (2006) classification of social preferences, there are two kinds of reciprocity models. The one is based on outcome fairness which is called inequity aversion model,the other is based on motivation fairness which is called reciprocity motivation model. Zhang De-peng (2013) built an incentive model of come fairness which explored the functional relationship customer participation in multi-task from the angle of outamong the degree of equity preferences, the measurement accuracy of output and the optimal incentive intensity. In addition, the range of optimal incentive intensity in individual task and team task was obtained. However, people not only emphasized the fair results, but also concern the motivation behind the behavior. Based on the above discussion, an incentive model of innovative customers' team cooperation is built in this paper based on Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger' s (2004) motivation fairness model. This paper attempts to explore the functional relationship among the sensitivity of reciprocity, the optimal participation time of customers, the compensation coefficient of individual performance, the share coefficient of team output and the expected benefit of firms by the solution and discussion of the model. The research shows that : hiring customers who have reciprocity preference to participate in product innovation can increase the expected benefit of firms; making innovative customers cooperate with others needs the basic condition;the effect of positive reciprocity on the optimal participation time of customers, the compensation coefficient of individual performance, the share coefficient of team output and the expected benefit of firms is opposite to the effect of negative reciprocity' s. In addition, test the analysis conclusions by an example about a project to enhance products. Finally, according to the research findings, the corresponding management recommendations are put forward.
出处 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第10期147-156,共10页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"顾客忠诚对赢利性的影响机理研究:基于行为视角"(71172097) 广东省自然科学基金项目"共创体验的价值形成机理:基于心理动力结构视角研究"(S2013010013913)
关键词 互惠偏好 激励机制 创新顾客 团队协作 reciprocity incentives innovative customer team cooperation
  • 相关文献

参考文献21

  • 1Arrow K. Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing[ M]. Chicago:Markham Publishing Co. , 1971.
  • 2Camerer C F, Fehr E. When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior? [ J ]. Science,2006,311, (5757) :47 - 52.
  • 3Dabholkar P A, Sheng X J. Consumer Participation in Using Online Recommendation Agents:Effects on Satisfaction, Trust, and Purchase Intentions [ J ]. The Service Industries Journal,2012,32, (9) : 1433 - 1449.
  • 4Dufwenberg M, Kirchsteiger G. A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity [ J ]. Games and Economic Behavior,2004,47, (2) :269 - 298.
  • 5Fehr E,Schmidt K M. Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity:Evidence and Economic Applications[C]. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 403,2000.
  • 6Grissemann U S, Stokburger-Sauer N E. Customer Co-creation of Travel Services: The Role of Company Support and Customer Satisfaction with the Co-creation Performance [ J ]. Tourism Management, 2012,33, (6) : 1483 - 1492.
  • 7Itoh H. Incentive to Help in Multi-agent Situations [ J ]. Econometrica, 1991,59, (3) :611 -636.
  • 8Kristensson P, Gustafsson A, Archer T. Harnessing the Creative Potential among Users [ J ]. Journal of Product Innovation Man- agement,2004,21, ( 1 ) :4 - 14.
  • 9Lovelock C H, Young R. Look to Consumers to Increase Productivity [ J ]. Harvard Business Review, 1979,57, (3) : 168 - 178.
  • 10Lundkvist A, Yakhlef A. Customer Involvement in New Service Development: A Conversational Approach [ J ]. Managing Service Quality ,2004,14, (2/3) :249 - 257.

二级参考文献105

  • 1田盈,蒲勇健.团队协作激励机制博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(2):133-135. 被引量:21
  • 2ALCHIAN A, DEMSETZ H. Production, information costs and economic organization [J]. American Economic Review, 1972,62(5) :777-795.
  • 3DRUCKER P. The new society of organizations [J]. Haryard Business Review,1992(9) :95-101.
  • 4HOLMSTROM B, MILGROM P. The firm as incentive system [J]. American Economic Review, 1994,84(8) :972-991.
  • 5DRAGO R. Competition and cooperation in the workplace [J]. Journal of Labor Economic Behavior and Organization, 1991,15(1) :347-364.
  • 6ITOH H. Incentive to help in multi-agent situations [J]. Econometrica, 1991,59(3) :611-636.
  • 7FEHR E, et al. Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experiment investigation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993,108(2):437-460.
  • 8BROWN M, FALK A, FEHR E. Relational contracts and the nature market interactions[J]. Econometrica, 2004,72 (3) :747-780.
  • 9CHARNESS G. Attribution and reciprocity in an experimental labor market [J].Journal of Labor Economics, 2004,22(3) :665-668.
  • 10RABIN M. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics[J].The American Economics Review, 1993,83 (5):1 291-1 302.

共引文献60

同被引文献117

引证文献10

二级引证文献42

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部