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产权管制研究范式及其现实意义--兼对国家理论的进一步思考 被引量:5

Research Paradigm of Regulation of Property Rights and Its Realistic Meanings——An Inquiry into the Theory of the State
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摘要 产权管制理论范式把"产权管制—公共领域—租金耗散"和"信息约束—管制放松—经济增长"这两个定律作为内核,并以原因、过程和绩效三个假说作为保护带。该范式把经济体制转轨理解为一个产权管制不断放松的过程。在此基础上,可以进一步围绕交易费用的内生性、外生性和内外均等化三条逻辑构建产权管制的契约范式,从而相应得到"剩余权利全面管制的工资契约"、"剩余权利无管制的定租契约"和"剩余权利均衡管制的分成契约"三个命题,最终构成一个基于产权管制契约范式的国家理论。该理论强调不同的产权管制契约类型分别对应着不同的产权管制制度结构,从而形成不同的国家组织模式。 The theoretic paradigm of regulation of property fights considers two theorems that refer to "regulation of property fights-public domain-rent dissipation" and "information constraint-deregulation- economic growth" as the internal core, and makes the performance hypothesis as its protective belt. Under this causation hypothesis, process hypothesis, and paradigm , economic transition is explained as a continuously process of deregulation of property fights. Based on it, we can revolve endogenous, exogenous, and internal-external equalization transaction cost logic to build the contractual paradigm of regulation of property fights. Eorrespondingly, the fixed wage contract proposition of overall regulation of residual fights, the fix rent contract proposition of unregulated residual rights and the share contract proposition of balanced residual fights form a theory of the State based on the contractual regulation of property fights. What's more, this theory emphasizes different contractual types of property fights correspond different institutional structures of regulation of property fights paradigm of of regulation , so different organization modes of the State are formed.
出处 《社会科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第10期37-46,共10页 Journal of Social Sciences
基金 教育部长江学者和创新团队发展计划创新团队项目“中国农村基本经营制度--转型理论与创新逻辑”(项目编号:IRT1062) 国家自然科学基金重点项目“农村土地与相关要素市场培育与改革研究”(项目编号:71333004) 国家自然科学基金青年项目“农地交易管制放松下农业经营组织的区位博弈机制研究:以广东为例”(项目编号:41301106) 国家社科基金青年项目“交易费用生成、权利管制放松与农地制度变革研究”(项目编号:12CJY050) 广东省自然科学基金博士启动项目“交易费用范式、权利管制放松与广东农地流转--博弈模型与实证分析”(S2012040007386)的阶段性成果
关键词 产权管制 管制放松 制度转轨 国家理论 政治交易费用 Regulation of Property Rights Deregulation Institutional Transition Theory of theState Political Transaction Costs
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参考文献25

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二级参考文献73

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