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直觉性和分析性决策的关系及其影响因素 被引量:2

The Relationship between Intuitive and Analytic Decision Making and its Influencing Factors
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摘要 直觉性决策是指由当前情境唤起的、对该情境的自动化和情绪化的笼统反应,这种反应与相关经验的内隐记忆具有高度一致性。分析性决策是指以逻辑规则为基础的、有意识的、理性判断的决策过程。直觉性和分析性决策之间存在顺序替代、反顺序替代以及平行作用三种关系。这三种关系的具体表现受到情境线索、元认知情绪以及人格特性的影响。今后应进一步探讨直觉性和分析性决策发生顺序替代和反顺序替代的具体条件,同时更加深入探讨情境、元认知情绪以及人格等因素对直觉性和分析性决策之间关系的交互影响作用。 Intuitive decision-making refers to the affectively charged judgment that arises through rapid , automatic and holistic response to the current situation , w hile analytic decision-making refers to the rational judgment w hich is slow , reflective , conscious and based on logical rules . T his paper discusses the advances based on the dual-process theory , and draws a conclusion that the relationship between intuitive and analytic decision-making could be substitution , reverse-substitution and simultaneous activation . After a systematically review of the related literatures , we carefully put forward that substitution , reverse-substitution or simultaneous activation , w hich is decided by situational cues , metacognitive feelings and personality traits . There are important theoretical and practical implications for further research on this topic , such as the contrastive study on tri-model of their relationship , the integrated study on the influencing factors and so on .
出处 《西北师大学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第5期124-129,共6页 Journal of Northwest Normal University(Social Sciences)
基金 全国教育科学规划国家一般项目"流动人口子女社会融合教育研究"(BFA110053) 清华大学自主科研项目"应对非常规突发事件的生理心理反应过程及其对决策的影响机制"(2010TH204)
关键词 直觉性决策 分析性决策 顺序替代 反顺序替代 双加工理论 intuitive decision making analytic decision making substitution reverse substitution dual process theory
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二级参考文献93

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