指称之争新解读:转喻论

A new understanding of argument on Referentialism:Metonymy view

20世纪的语言哲学界围绕"指称论"展开了旷日持久的争论。以Frege、Russell、Wittgenstein、Searle等为代表的一方认为:专名既有外延也有内涵,其内涵为"涵义"(sense)或"摹状语"(description),坚持从语义学角度论述专名;以Strawson、Donnellan、Kripke、Putnam等为代表另一方则认为:专名只有外延而无内涵,主要关注专名的实际使用,主张从语用学角度研究专名。他们对意义的分析方法和论述路径对外语界的语义学研究有深远的指导意义。本文主要基于体验哲学和认知语言学,提出用"命名转喻论"为双方提供一个统一的解释方案。

There has been a prolonged argument on 'Referentialism'in the Circle of Philosophy of Language in the 20 th Century.The school represented by Frege,Russell,Wittgenstein,Searle etc.,adheres to the semantic viewpoint for proper names,and thinks that they have both extension and intension,with its intension being'sense'or'description'.While the other school represented by Strawson,Donnellan,Kripke,Putnam etc.,adheres to the pragmatic viewpoint with main interest in their practical use,and thinks that proper names have only extension,but no intension.Their analysing methodology and meaning exposition have profound significance for the semantic study in our foreign language circle.The present paper,based on Embodied Philosophy and Cognitive Linguistics,has proposed'Metonymy View for Naming',in the hope of offering a unified explanation for the two schools.