公平偏好视角下的“龙头企业+农户”供应链关系治理研究

The Relational Governance between Chinese Leading Agricultural Enterprises and their Cooperative Farmers in the Frame of Fairness Preferences

针对"龙头企业+农户"供应链中由于不公平交易而导致农户生产投资水平下降这一现实,研究了公平偏好影响龙头企业和农户间博弈结果的机理,并有针对性地提出了供应链关系治理的建议。研究结果表明:当农户具有公平偏好时,龙头企业不公平的收购价格是导致农户生产投资意愿降低的主要原因;不公平的收购价格不仅会降低农户的效用,同时也会降低龙头企业以及供应链整体的效用;强化龙头企业和农户间交易的公平性,能够激励农户提高生产投资水平,最终实现供应链上下游的"双赢"。

Many studies have confirmed that fairness preference has influence on decision making processes.However,fairness preference is often not considered in most agri-food supply chain management researches.Because unfair trade will reduce the willingness of farmers＇ investment,we incorporate the fairness preference into the ＂ Chinese leading agricultural enterprises ＋ farmers＂ mode and investigate how fairness preference will affect equilibrium outcomes in the agri-food supply chain system.In this paper,we mainly construct the Stackelberg Game model in two different cases and analyze the equilibriums of the interaction between the leading enterprise and the farmer.A leading agricultural enterprise is the leader who will make decision on the wholesale price.The farmer is the follower that determines the quantity of investment according to the wholesale price decided by the leading enterprise.In addition,we assume that information for leading enterprises and followers to cooperate is common knowledge.Analysis results show that there are six important findings：（1） Unfair wholesale price proposed by the leading enterprises can significantly reduce the level of farmers＇ production inputs if farmers have the fairness preference ; （2） The utilities of farmers,leading enterprises and the whole supply chain will decrease simultaneously when leading enterprises trade with the fair-minded farmers; （3） The farmers＇ higher investment will increase if transactions between leading enterprises and farmers can become much fairer; （4） It is beneficial for the leading agricultural enterprise to increase the wholesale price after considering the farmers＇ fairness preference; （5） The higher level of farmer＇ s aversion to unfairness will lead to the decreased willingness to invest; and （6） It is noteworthy that leading agricultural enterprises will have a lower proportion of the whole utility when confronted with the farmers with fairness preference.These results indicate that unfair transactions can affect the willingness of the farmers＇ investment in a detrimental way and result in low investment.Because the leading agricultural enterprise and the farmer co-exist as a system,unfair transactions will decrease that effectiveness of supply chain performance.The six findings verify our proposed hypotheses that the performance of the whole supply chain can be improved if more profit can be passed from the leading agricultural enterprise to the farmer.Because the farmer＇ s productive investment is the prerequisite for good cooperation,it is necessary to enhance fair transactions between the leading agricultural enterprise and the fair-minded farmer in order to achieve win-win results.