审计师选择与会计信息质量的替代性研究——基于稳健性原则对信用评级影响视角

The Substitution between Auditor Choice and Accounting Information Quality——Evidence from the effect on credit rating by conservatism principle

现有研究鲜有讨论高水平审计师选择与高质量会计信息在传递信号方面是否存在替代性。本文基于我国发行信用债券的1891个企业样本,从信用评级视角出发,研究了高水平审计师选择与高质量会计信息的信号替代性。结果表明,拥有高质量会计信息的企业更可能选择高水平审计师,以强化其不会侵占投资者的信号效应,而且外部审计师选择信号和会计信息质量信号均得到了信用评级机构的正面评价。选择高水平审计师能够部分替代但不能完全替代高质量会计信息对信用评级的积极影响。

The existing research rarely discussed the accounting information in the transmission of signals. substitution between the high level auditor and the high quality Using 1891 firms issuing bonds in China, this paper study the substitution of signals between the high level auditor and the high quality accounting information from the perspec- tive of credit rating. We find that firms with high quality accounting information will be more likely to choose high quality auditor to further guarantee their signals of non-tunneling investors, and this incentive indeed has been rec- ognized by the credit rating agencies. Selection of high level auditors can partly replace but cannot completely replace the positive effect of high quality accounting information on credit rating.