市场领导者与行业质量水平:内生质量和时序选择模型

Market Leadership and Industrial Quality:an Endogenous Quality and Timing Model

本文探讨不同的定价时序如何影响双寡头模型中的质量选择问题。研究表明:在一个垂直产品差异的双寡头博弈中,与同时定价博弈相比,厂商采用序贯定价会使市场内的高、低质量差距缩小;而且跟随者利润上升,领导者利润却会下降,消费者剩余和社会总剩余都会下降。最后,还发现在内生时序选择模型中,均衡时序选择会是高、低质量企业都选择作为跟随者进行同时定价。

Effects of pricing leadership on endogenous quality decisions in a duopoly are examined with ver- tical product differentiation. The study that quality gap between high and low quality products decreases in the market with leadership （sequential game） compared to the market without leadership （simultaneous game）. Follower＇s profit always increases but the leader＇s profit decreases. Furthermore, both consumer surplus and social welfare decreases in the leadership model. Finally, it also can be found that with a single pre-game delay stage, the resulting endogenous timing has both firms being followers.