摘要
在对私募股权基金各种退出方式特点进行梳理的基础上,本文运用博弈论工具构建了风险企业家和风险投资家的博弈模型。分析认为,要使二者的总效用最大化,应该根据风险企业的价值来选择退出方式。在实证考察中,我们发现美国的情况支持前述理论结果,而我国的情况则与理论分析发生了背离。分析产生背离的原因后,我们认为,国内PE应该提前转变理念,争取实现长期收益最大化。同时,要建立完善全国统一的产权交易市场,为并购退出提供平台。
On the basis of sorting out the various features of the exit strategy of private equity funds, this paper built, with the game theory tools, the game model for venture entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Through analysis, it holds that to maximize the total utility of the two parties, the opt - out way should be based on the value of the venture enterprises. The empirical test shows that the cases in the United States support the previous theoretical results, but ours deviate from the theoretical analysis. After analyzing the causes of the deviation, it is believed that the domestic PE should change its concept in advance striving to achieve long - term revenue maximization. Meanwhile, a unified national property rights exchange market should be established and improved, to provide a platform for M&A exit.
出处
《成都大学学报(社会科学版)》
2014年第4期18-22,共5页
Journal of Chengdu University (Social Sciences)