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基于拍卖后市场产品差异化与风险厌恶的英式拍卖研究及改进 被引量:1

A Study and the Improvement of English Auction with Aftermarket Products Differentiation and Risk Aversion
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摘要 依据寡头垄断模型和拍卖理论,针对当前基于拍卖后市场的研究理论难以真实反映拍卖后产品市场的差异化竞争及拍卖过程中的风险规避态度的现状,在现有的基于拍卖后市场竞争的拍卖模型基础上进行拓展与改进,分别建立基于拍卖后产品市场差异化竞争的英式拍卖模型及基于投标双方风险规避的英式拍卖模型,研究改进模型下的投标人的最优投标策略及政府的期望利润,分析模型参数对最优投标策略及政府期望利润的影响。研究表明:1拍卖后产品市场产品差异性越大,投标者对市场准入许可证的报价越高,政府期望利润越大;2投标者报价与投标者的风险规避度正相关,政府的期望效用与政府风险规避度负相关,与中标者的风险规避度系数正相关。研究改进了现有拍卖模型在拍卖后产品市场差异化以及拍卖双方风险规避方面的不足,具有更为普遍的现实意义与适用性。 Based on oligopoly model and auction theory, the English auction models with products differentiation and both buyers' and sellers' risk attitudes are extended and improved. The purposes are to address the problems that current aftermarket auction model may not reflect products diversity and risk attitudes of the two parties in trade. The bidders' optimal strategies and the government expected profits are analyzed with the improved models. Each parameter' s influences on bidding function and the government expected profits are also discussed. The study shows that the more diversified the products of aftermarket are, the higher the bidding for market entry license is, and the more the government expected profits are; there is a positive correlation between bidding price and risk attitude, while the government expected profit has a negative correlation with the government's risk attitude, but a positive correlation with bidders' risk aversion.
作者 黄莺 郑士源
出处 《系统管理学报》 CSSCI 2014年第5期628-635,共8页 Journal of Systems & Management
基金 国家社会科学基金青年项目(11CGL077) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC630412) 上海海事大学校科研基金资助项目(20110059)
关键词 拍卖后市场 英式拍卖 产品差异化 风险厌恶 投标策略 政府期望利润 aftermarket English auction products differentiation risk aversion bidding strategy government expected profits
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参考文献17

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