工程招标委托代理关系中的激励与监督

Incentive and Supervision in the Agency Relationship of Engineering Tendering

本文针对目前工程招标代理过程中产生的一些困惑招投标市场的问题，从招标人与工程招标代理机构的委托代理关系出发，在工程招标代理服务费为固定报酬的情况下，研究了信息不对称情况下工程招标代理机构的“道德风险”问题。

This paper in view of some problems confusing bi-dding market in current project bidding process, starting from the principal-agent relationship between the tenderee and tend-ering agency, under the circumstance of the project bidding ag-ency service fee for the fixed reward, studies the “moral ha-zard”problem of project bidding agency in information asym-metry situation.