摘要
基于农户视角,对土地流转风险进行识别,论述农户为追求风险最低与土地受让方发生的博弈行为。农户与受让方之间的不完全信息动态博弈风险主要存在于合同管理方面,该博弈与农户掌握信息量的多少和市场的完善程度高度相关,市场中受让方准入标准以及违规处罚力度尤为重要。农户与农村集体经济组织的完全信息动态博弈风险主要存在于维权上访方面,由上访渠道的通畅性和监管部门的公信力决定。最后,根据博弈结果,给出了增强农户自身风险管理能力、加强制度建设、完善土地流转市场化建设、配套建立土地流转风险防范措施的政策建议,为土地的顺利流转提供参考依据。
The risks of land transfer identified from rural household and the game behavior between rural household and other behavior subjects were analyzed in order to take the lowest risk. Dynamic games of incomplete information risks, mainly in the contract management between transferee and rural household, were highly associated with the amount of information that rural household gets and the perfection of the market. The access standards of transferee as well as the illegal penalties were very significant in the market. The dynamic games of complete information risks, lying in the rights of petitioners between collective economic organizations and rural household, were decided by the petitioning channel and the credibility of supervi- sion department. Finally, suggestions were given to provide reference for smooth land transfer based on game theory, such as increasing farmers" ability of risk management, strengthening the system construction, perfecting the market construction of land transfer and establishing the risk prevention measures of land transfer.
出处
《湖北农业科学》
北大核心
2014年第15期3716-3720,共5页
Hubei Agricultural Sciences
关键词
农户视角
土地流转
风险
博弈
rural household perspective
land transfer
risk
game theory