规制权利配置、均衡影响与社会性规制体系完善

Configuration of Regulation Rights,Equilibrium Effect and Improvement of Social Regulation

许多研究表明,社会性规制失效已不是简单的投入不足问题,其背后蕴藏的深刻动因值得我们探析,本文从规制权利的纵向配置出发,对Fredriksson&Gaston(2000)模型进行调整,分析并比较了规制集权与规制分权的均衡结果,并结合中国社会性规制现实分析造成社会性规制失效的可能动因。研究表明,在一定假设下,规制集权与分权都可以达到最优的均衡。结合中国社会性规制体制制度特征,本文认为,调整地方政府的目标函数及其行为,畅通公众偏好表达渠道是提高规制决策与实施效果的重要因素。在此基础上,给出了中国社会性规制体系完善的初步设想。

As many studies have shown, loss of effectiveness of social regulation is not merely a problem of under-invest-ment any more.The real reason for it is worth exploring.This article begins at the longitudinal configuration of regulation rights.With an adjusted model of Fredriksson & Gaston (2000), it analyzes and compares the resulting effects of centraliza-tion and decentralization of regulation rights.The study shows that both centralization and decentralization practices can a-chieve optimal equilibrium under certain assumptions.Considering China's reality, this paper argues that revising the objective function of local governments and smoothing the channels for expressing public preferences are important steps to improve the effects of regulatory decision-making and implementation.It provides some basic thoughts on the reconstruction of Chinese so-cial regulation system.