真理的语用和限度

The Pragmatic Dimension of Truth and Its Limit

在真理问题传统哲学视野之外,关于真理在生活世界中的实际语用维度是一个值得探讨的问题。真理作为某种"真的东西",超越单纯认知意义上的"真",还包含道义性的"真(的道)理"的维度。在科学和日常行为层面上,"真"关乎"成事",而在社会生活中,我们常常用"真"说事论"理",后者即真理的社会语用层面。严格意义上的真理的到场其实不是用说的,而当以真理的名义说事时,实际上蕴涵着此际真理的不在场。在论理语言游戏中,以真为理乃基于其在科学领域中作为竞争性语言游戏胜出者所蕴涵的话语权威,问题是,排他性真理的决出实非社会场域语言游戏的常规。并且,单纯的真本身亦不具足道义合理性与正当性。在社会场域中,话语的合理性大多数情况下表现为"并行不悖"的各种道理。

Outside the perspective of traditional theories of truth in philosophical investigations,the pragmatic dimension of truth in the life world is a research question that is well worth looking into. As'something that is true',the concept of truth is more than'true'in a purely cognitive sense and it also contains a moral dimension of'true reasons'. On the scientific and everyday behavioral levels,'true'is relevant to'accomplishment'. However,in social life,we often use'true'to do'reasoning',the latter being the social pragmatic dimension of truth. Technically,the presence of truth is default and when things are said in the name of truth,it actually indicates the absence of truth. In the game of argument,to use'true'to do reasoning is based on its discursive authority possessed by the winner in the competitive language games in the field of science. But the problem is,the winning on the part of the exclusive truth is not normal in the non-social language games. Furthermore,'true'alone is not morally reasonable and justified. In the social context,the rationality of discourse is represented mostly as all kinds of reasons and principles which are'compatible'with each other.