制度视角的家族治理与企业绩效研究--来自中德上市家族企业的对比证据

Family Governance and Firm Performance based on the Institutional Perspective: Comparative Evidence from Chinese and Germany Listed Family Firms

家族集中所有权、控制权和家族涉入管理对企业绩效到底有利还是有弊?相对于发达资本主义国家的企业,处于转型经济中的中国企业面临的外部不确定性更高,上述关系在不同经济体之间是否有区别?企业的治理效果取决于内外两种机制,内部的家族治理系统是对外部制度环境的不完善的补充。我们选取处于成熟市场经济的德国上市家族企业与处于转型经济中的中国上市家族企业进行实证对比,从制度的视角来探讨上述问题。研究结果显示两国上市家族企业的家族治理与企业绩效之间的关系是不一样的。结论表明治理结构并不一定对企业绩效产生直接影响,不同的制度环境会导致不同的作用机制产生。

Do the family concentrated ownership, family control and family involved management benefit firm performance？ Compare to the corporations in the developed countries, the Chinese corporations in the transit economy face higher uncertainty from external environment. Do the above relationships have any differences between different economies？ The corporate governance performance depends on the efficiency of a bundle of governance mechanisms including internal and external ones. The internal family governance system can substitute for the imperfect external institutional environment. We choose and empirically compare the listed family firms in German as mature economy and in China as transit economy, discussing those above questions from institutional perspective. The results show that the relationships between family governance and firm performance are different from two countries. The conclusions demonstrate that governance structure does not necessarily distinctly affect the firm performance, and different institutional environment results in different mechanism.