灾后捐助、保费补助对巨灾保险需求影响的理论研究被引量：6

The Effect of Donation,Subsidy on Demand for Catastrophe Insurance

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摘要巨灾保险与灾后捐助构成了灾后的赔付体系。高效率的赔付体系下,巨灾保险应该着重发挥财产损失的赔偿优势,而灾后捐助应该发挥在灾民生活与精神的赔付上的优势。但目前我国灾后的赔付体系基本由灾后捐助构成,有限的捐助资金难以满足居民全部的财产赔偿,更无法满足灾民精神上和生活上的补偿,两者难以发挥各自应有的功能。在理论分析的基础上,研究了灾后捐助与巨灾保险需求的关系,结果表明:目前的灾后捐助体系对于个人巨灾保险需求具有一定的挤出效应,即存在"慈善危害"(Charity Hazard),但这种挤出效应可以通过政府的保费补贴来消除;同时,随着灾后捐助比例的增加,政府需要对巨灾保费补贴的比例也在不断增加。 Catastrophe insurance,donation and government＇s fund constitute the general compensation system.To make the rescue work more efficiently,catastrophe insurer should make full of its advanta-ges in financial reparation,while donors should weigh higher on victims＇living circumstances and men-tal health.However,China＇s compensation systems mainly rely on donation and government aid.Fund raised by them is limited in satisfying all the victims,not to mention help them refresh.Comparative advantages of insurers,donors and government is in vague.This paper studies the effect brought about by donation and government on catastrophe insurance demand,we conclude that the donation will crowd out individual demand for catastrophe insurance,which can be relieved by premium subsidy. From this perspective,we study the relationship between subsidy and donation premise that individu-als purchase full insurance.

作者田玲姚鹏

机构地区武汉大学经济与管理学院

出处《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第5期727-733,740,共7页 Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基金国家社科基金重大招标项目"我国巨灾保险制度安排与实施路径研究"(11&ZD053) 教育部人文社科规划项目"中国巨灾保险供给能力研究"(09YJA790149)

关键词巨灾保险灾后捐助保费补贴挤出效应保险需求 catastrophe insurance donation premium subsidy crowd out effect insurance demand

分类号 F840.64 [经济管理—保险] X43 [环境科学与工程—灾害防治]

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