国有股权、债务结构与大股东利益侵占

State Ownership,Debt Structure and Benefits Expropriation by Large-shareholder

利用2010—2012年我国A股市场国有上市公司数据,研究了债务融资及其不同的组成部分在治理大股东侵占中小股东利益方面的作用。研究发现,债务融资与国有企业大股东利益侵占呈显著负向关系,即国有企业债务融资行为对大股东利益侵占具有治理作用;短期借款、非公开债务与公开债务均与国有企业大股东利益侵占呈显著正向关系、长期借款却无法充分发挥其治理作用。其政策含义是,债务融资在治理大股东对国有上市公司利益侵占时,应当关注短期借款以及债务的布置结构所带来的不利影响。

Based on the data of the state- owned listed companies in Chinese A market from 2010- 2012,studying the governance effect of debt financing and its different components on large shareholders expropriate the benefits of minority shareholders. The study found that there is a significant negative relationship between debt financing and benefits expropriation by large shareholder,that state- owned companies＇ debt financing have the governance effect on benefits expropriation. Short- term borrowings,on- public debts and public debts have significant positive effect on benefits expropriation by large shareholder. Long- term borrowings cannot fully play its role in this governance. The results show that the negative effect which bring by short- term debt and debt arrangement structure should be concerned.