笛卡尔的机械论解释与目的论解释

Descartes' Mechanical and Teleological Explanations

一直以来,我们都习惯于把笛卡尔对机械论的支持以及他对目的论的反对看作他的一项重要的哲学贡献。然而,这一论断并没有像初看那样清楚,笛卡尔关于机械论与目的论的立场也没有人们一般所认为的那么简单。在本文中,我首先区分了机械论与目的论的两个不同的层面:作为一种本体论以及作为一种解释方法。本文对于笛卡尔的机械论与目的论思想的讨论主要限定在解释方法这一层面,而非本体论的层面。在解释感觉以及激情的时候,笛卡尔一方面坚持做出机械论的解释,反对目的论的解释;另一方面他似乎又采纳了某种目的论的解释。这就引发了一个问题:笛卡尔到底是在什么意义上来主张机械论并攻击目的论的呢?这篇文章的主要目的就在于回答这个问题。在对笛卡尔的文本进行详细的分析之后,我将试图论证笛卡尔的说法并不存在理论上的不一致。

We have been accustomed to speak of Descartes' embrace of mechanism and his denunciation of teleology as one of his greatest contributions to modern philosophy.However,this claim is not as clear as it seems to be at first sight,and Descartes' position is not as simple as it is generally thought to be.In this paper,first of all,I distinguish between two aspects of mechanism and teleology:as a kind of ontology and as a method of explanation.All my discussion in this paper is about Descartes' mechanical explanations and his teleological explanations.Since,in explaining sensations and passions,he seems to adopt some sort of teleological explanations that he proscribed,a question has been raised:In what sense did Descartes advocate mechanism and assault on teleology? My intension is simply to answer this question.After a closer analysis of Descartes' context,I try to argue that there is no incoherence.