信用交易与通货膨胀的福利损失--基于货币搜寻理论的视角

Credit Trading and the Welfare Cost of Inflation:A Search Approach

不同于货币效用模型(MIU)和现金约束模型(CIA)引入货币的特定方式,货币搜寻模型具有货币更深刻的微观基础。本文拓展了Faig&Li(2009)货币搜寻理论新古典一般均衡的框架,分析了信用交易对通货膨胀福利损失的影响。本文发现:一方面,信用交易使购买者的需求不受当期持有货币数量的约束,从而减少了通货膨胀带来的福利损失;另一方面,信用交易通过影响购买者的货币需求增加了福利损失。因此,信用交易对通货膨胀福利成本总的影响取决于信用交易的正效应和负效应哪种效应占优。校准模型后数值模拟结果显示,随着信用交易规模的增加,通货膨胀的福利损失是逐渐减小的。由本文的结论可知,推动我国金融市场不断发展,扩大信用交易的规模对提高国民的福利具有重要作用。

Other than money-in-utility （MIU） or cash-in-advance （CIA） model, the search model of money is based on explicit money micro-foundation. We extend Faig ＆ Li （2009） neoclassical money search framework to analyze the effect of credit trading on the welfare cost of inflation. We find that： on one hand credit trading increases welfare by alleviating the budget constraint of buyers, but on the other hand it decreases welfare by increasing the cost of holding money. Whether the total welfare effect of credit trading is positive or negative depends on which effect dominates. After calibration, our numerical result shows that the welfare cost of inflation decreases as the scale of credit trading increases. The paper suggests that to develop financial market and to enlarge the scale of credit trading system will have significant impact on social welfare.