国有企业纪委的治理参与能否抑制高管私有收益?

Can the Governance Involvement of State-owned Companies' Disciplinary Commission Effectively Inhabit the Managers' Private Benefits?

本文基于我国2003—2012年国有上市公司数据,考察纪委的治理参与对高管私有收益的可能影响。在将高管私有收益分为货币性私有收益和非货币性私有收益之后,本文研究发现:国有企业纪委参与公司治理(与纪委未参与公司治理的情况相比)对高管的非货币性私有收益有显著的抑制作用,而对高管的货币性私有收益则无显著影响。在进一步考察国有企业纪委的治理参与在不同情景中的作用时,本文发现:当国有企业纪委参与监事会治理(与参与董事会治理的情况相比)、国有企业总经理是中共党员(与总经理不是中共党员的情况相比),以及在中央国有企业(与在地方国有企业中的情况相比)时,纪委的治理参与对高管的非货币性私有收益的抑制作用更强。

Based on the state-owned listed companies from 2003 to 2012 in China, the paper explores the influence of governance involvement of disciplinary commission on managers＇ private benefits. Classified the managers＇ private benefits into monetary private benefits and non-monetary private benefits, the paper finds that： the governance involvement of disciplinary commission has the significant negative influences on the managers＇ non-monetary private benefits, and has no influence on the managers＇ monetary private benefits. When examining the moderating effects of several conditions, the paper further finds that： when the disciplinary commission involves the board, when the CEO is a Party Membership, or when companies are central state-owned companies, the negative relationship between the governance involvement of disciplinary commission and managers＇ non-monetary private benefits will be stronger.