地方政府间环境规制竞争策略及其地区增长效应——来自地级市以上城市面板的经验数据

Inter-local Government Strategies of Environmental Regulation Competition and Its Economic Growth Effect

本文选取2004-2009年地级市以上城市的经验数据,运用空间杜宾面板模型试图识别出地方政府间环境规制竞争策略及其增长效应。实证结果表明,自2003年落实科学发展观以来,地方政府间的环境规制"逐底竞争"不再是全局性问题,而是局部性问题。无论是地理意义上的相邻性地区,还是经济意义上的相邻性地区,唯有中部地区城际政府间的环境规制"逐底竞争"证据显著,其他地区则表现出不同的竞争类型。其中,东部和东北地区城际政府环境规制为"差异化竞争";西部地区则没有明显的环境规制竞争策略。与此同时,政府环境规制竞争对经济增长效应的作用方向存在地区差异。其中,东部和东北地区环境规制竞争具有显著的正增长效应;中部地区则为负增长效应;西部地区表现为不显著的增长效应。这些研究既为创新各级政府环境治理体制机制提供改进空间,又为推进环境政策差别化机制提供决策参考。

The paper uses panel data of prefecture-level （and above） cities from 2004 to 2009, identifies whether environmental regulation ＂Race to Bottom＂ was global and local problem, and its economic growth effect by using Spatial Panel Durbin Model. Main conclusions are as follows. Since 2003, the environmental regulation ＂Race to Bottom＂ strategy among local governments was not an overall issue, but a local issue. ＂Race to Bottom＂ strategy got support in central region in both the geographical-weight and the economic-weight matrixes, while other regions showed different types of competition. Meanwhile, the effects of government environmental regulation competition on economic growth are various in different regions, while the effects in eastern and northeastern regions are positive, that in central region is negative, and that in western region is not prominent. The study not only provides governments at all levels with improvement space in innovating environmental regulation mechanism, but also offers decision reference for improving differential mechanism in environmental policies.